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Hmmm, I am not sure whether I am talking about a certain kind of appropriateness rather than all of them.

For example that a cop needs probable cause to do what otherwise would be breaking and entering is a kind of thing that is not about correctness. That is if he does the thing and there is a crime going on there can still be a valid complaint that the arrest is illegal because no probable cause was established. On the other hand if there is probable cause and there is no crime it doesn't mean he shouldn't have done it. "What was that noise, I need to go check that out" is perfectly okay but "Somebody just got shot, I should go arrest the shooter" can be incorrect but appropriate. You don't improve the situation by training your ear to be better at distinquishing gunshots from other sounds. You improve the situation by not making unwarranted statements of fact.

While it is common property for deep ideologies to develop a blind spot for potential counterevidence its not a neccesary property. For the kinds of appropriateness I am focusing on it is clearly inappropriate to hold knowingly false beliefs and appropriate to take reasonable measures to keep your beliefs factual. That is lying to yourself is inappropriate while it can't be false.

There is a kind of culture that disregards issues of fairness but is very strict on correctness. That is kind of an opposite rule of thump that truth will result to prosperity. But then there are context like trials. There we always condition on "given the evidence" ie we are not allowed to peek on the issue any more accurately than the methods provided. The rules on what evidence to admit can be understood in terms of degree of reliability of it but it can also be understood of balancing the load of inevitable human error. That is it would be unfair if a trial would need to use millions of dollars to decide a crime of only a relatively minor punishment. Thus we don't convict people based on whether they did or not but based on whether we can effectively show that they did it or not. Thus a "lack of evidence" non-quilty verdict can be appropriate even if the party in question did it.

There is an additional potentially more crucial worry beside risk of falsehood. That is if you do yield the facts but interpret them unfairly. If a young earth christian digs up dinosaur bones he might tell a story of testing ones faith. That is things that should be nature rubbing its details into your face you can almost ignore. It's not that you don't know that the bones exist, but that you choose to interpret them in a funky way. In a similar way you might come to think that a quantum wave function is a mathematical fiction while someone else says its a real thing. Someone might say that it's "only a philosophical question" and that both interpretations agree on the facts and that there is nothing else to it. Similarly one could try to argue "We are all going to die so nothing really matters". Death is a really strongly inductively verified phenomena. The method of defeating nihilism by saying that it is false seems pretty hopeless. Someone else can say that "We are all going to die, so I am free to rape to my own amusement since the end result will be the same". This seems to use the same facts as nihilism and be as correct as it is but they both seem inappropriate interferences to make and it seems there would be much more appropriate conclusions to be interfered.

In a way a mathematician isn't interested in the truth or falsehood of the axioms he uses. He is concerned that the proof is valid and that the result is arrived at via a proof and not just a correct guess.






Hmmm, I am not sure whether I am talking about a certain kind of appropriateness rather than all of them.

I think on this issue being very specific may be crucial.

It is one thing to say - “This statement is probably true, but I don’t have a 100% proof, so I’m not going to act on it”.

It is another thing to say – “This thought is probably true, but it is inappropriate/racist/sexist, so I’m going to suppress it.”

The examples from your last comment refer to the former case, while the previous comments refer to the latter.

For the kinds of appropriateness I am focusing on it is clearly inappropriate to hold knowingly false beliefs

The problem is that, unlike mathematical theorems, our ideological views cannot generally be proven false. Instead, we need to weigh the arguments for the different sides. Thus it is often not required to hold knowingly false beliefs – simply avoiding certain thoughts as inappropriate would be sufficient to tilt the balance.
and appropriate to take reasonable measures to keep your beliefs factual.

Can you describe these measures?
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melian
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